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Asymmetry in views of depositors and bankers can generate failures of …-
nancial intermediation in linking creditors and borrowers, and/or result in
excessively high interest rates. Instead of considering asymmetry in assess-
ment of bank’s solvency, this paper focuses on asymmetry in views as to
whether an insolvent bank will be liquidated or let to continue. Bailout pol-
icy has two e¤ects in this respect: …rst, insurance e¤ect, which lowers market
interest rates, and secondly announcement e¤ect, which rules the asymmetry
in beliefs out.The literature on banking crises and panics stresses, that asymmetry in
views of depositors and bankers makes crises more severe and limits abil-
ities of regulatory agencies to rescue banks through liquidity provision by
monetary policy means (see e.g. Calomiris and Mason, 1997, or Corbet and
Mitchell, 2000). However, the asymmetry is treated in a way that depositors
(andthe regulator) overestimate banks’ portfolio’s risk relative to the estima-
tion of banks themselves. In this paper, there is no information asymmetry
in this sense: all agents have true information about the riskiness of banks’
assets. On the contrary, asymmetry is presented in views of depositors and
banks regarding outcomes in case of banks’ insolvency. When the banks be-
lieve they would be allowed to continue even in case of insolvency, depositors
assume insolvent banks to be closed in absence of bailout. Symmetric cases
of unlimited liability (banks believe to continue and depositors believe to get
their deposits repaid in full) and limited liability (banks believe to be closed
in case of insolvency, and depositors believe to be repaid only in the amount
of bank’s assets value) are brie‡y discussed in Sinn (2003). Contrary to Sinn
(2003), we understand here unlimited liability not as the case ”where banks
will always keep their promises” but rather as the case, where the banks
expect to be able to do so.
The theory of banking widely uses the principle of limited liability in
modelling banking behaviour. Although the literature on limited liability in
economics is relatively large (see e.g. the reviewby Noe andSmith, 1997), its
applications to banking are scarce. The research focuses mostly on the ideas
that limited liability can give the bankers incentives to take too much risk
(e.g. Gollier, Koehl and Rochet, 1995), and/or leads to the excessive interest
rates, if intermediation is competitive (e.g. Matutes and Vives, 2000). Other
e¤ects of limited liability, as well as the question as to howfar the principle of
limited liability can hold in practice, su¤er a certain lack of attention. This
paper aims, therefore, to contribute in …lling this gap, in which it compares
two worlds: one with and one without limited liability, and studies the dif-
ferences arising in the deposit market. Particular attention will be paid to
the question ad to whether limited or unlimited liability allows banks to per-
form their role as a link between creditors (depositors) and borrowers (…rms)
better of worse, and as to whether this performance can be improved.
Before we start theoretical analysis, consider actual practice concerning
liability of banks. Dewatripont and Tirole (1993) distinguish between four
ways of handling bank failures: (1) liquidation (payo¤ resolution), when the
bank is closed and put under receivership, and uninsured claimants are paid
o¤ after the assets of the bank are liquidated; (2) merger (purchase and
assumption), when a healthy bank purchases all or some of the assets of the
failed bank and assumes all or some of the liabilities; (3) government loans
1or transfers (open bank assistance), when the supervisory agency provides
…nancial assistance to a failed bank in form of loans, asset purchases or cash
to restore capital to a positive level; and (4) government ownership (bridge
bank), with a supervisory agency acting temporarily as the acquire, taking
over the operations of a failing bank and maintaining banking services for the
customers.1 From the point of viewof the customers, the bank is closed only
in one of the four cases, namely liquidation, in all other cases customers can
continue workingwiththe bank, be it rescued, assumed or nationalised. From
the point of viewof the bank, however, it continues its operations only if it is
bailed out through loans or transfers2, since otherwise it is either liquidated
or assumed by other institution, in which cases the failed bank itself is not
liable anymore to its customers. This point deserves special attention and
we discuss this asymmetry later on.
Most research in the …eld of bank failure resolutions concentrate on re-
solving illiquid but solvent banks. Following standard de…nitions, insolvency
occurs when the value of the assets held by a bank is less than the value
of the liabilities held; illiquidity occurs however when a bank is not able to
meet its current obligations as they come due, so that illiquidity can arise
even if a bank is solvent, due e.g. to banking panics. In addition to this,
it is possible that insolvency arises when a bank is still liquid, and this case
seems to be much less studied in the literature. Gersbach and Wenzelburger
(2002) and Vinogradov (2003) have shown, that in a dynamic setting, insol-
vent banks (whose liabilities are above their assets) can still be liquid due
to newly acquired deposits, which provide them with su¢cient liquidity to
pay out debts to the previous generation of depositors. In fact, as Bennett
(2001) writes, ”an insolvent bank is more likely to continue to operate in
developing economies or economies in transition: one half of the respondents
[local banking regulators - D.V.] in this group have allowed insolvent banks
to operate, whereas 3 of the 14 [not as little, more than 20% - D.V.] deposit
insurers in advanced economies have done so”. In general 35% of respon-
dents (10 out of 28) did not deny practice where equity-insolvent depository
institutions have been allowed to operate for extended periods. Just one ex-
1Bennett (2001) provides a detailed discussion on international evidence on the types
of resolution, based upon a survey on deposit insurance practice in 34 countries, includ-
ing advanced, developing and transitional economies. See also Santomero and Ho¤man
(1998) for the discussion of problem banks resolution methods and Bhattacharya, Boot
and Thakor (1998) for a discussion of theoretical views on bank closure policy.
2There is also a possibilty that the regulator follows the policy of forbearance, where
the insolvent bank is let to operate further, and interventions are ambiguosly postponed.
For the purpose of this paper it is important that all possible schemes are realised in just
two outcomes for the failing bank: either continuation or closure.
2ample in this connection: during 4 years (1988-92) FDIC allowed insolvent
First City Bancorporation (with 59 branches in USA) to operate through
open bank assistance, and only in 1992 recurring losses of the bank led to its
closure.
These considerations put under the question the arguments in favour of
limited liability principle. Excluding limited liability implies, that if banks
su¤er losses, and their capital (di¤erence between assets and liabilities) falls
below zero, they still continue operating and start the next period with neg-
ative capital.3 On the contrary, under limited liability, banks should have
been closed in case of negative capital, which implies that pro…t of the bank
is always nonnegative: if it is negative, the bank is closed, and net pro…t of
the banker is zero, whereas its losses are borne by bank’s creditors, who get
only the rest value of the bank.4
Interms offailure resolutions above, we focus ontheopenbank assistance,
which allows the bank to continue its operations. Freixas (2000) considers
open bank assistance through subsidy, which covers bank’s debts in case of
bailout, rather than a loan-based rescue. A loan-based rescue instead re-
places one liabilities of the bank with other, whereas subsidy (or at least a
combination of subsidies and loans) a¤ects incentives of the banks and hence
the market situation in general. For the purpose of this paper it is important
that the bank in case ofbailout obtains the possibility tocontinue, andthere-
fore bears losses (if any). Such continuation can be possible through credit
obtained from a third party (e.g. loans from LOLR, or newly accumulated
deposits) to repay current debts. We do not consider the next period after
insolvency to exclude possible subsidisation e¤ect, and concentrate only on
the incentives generated purely by the possibility of continuation. In this
setting the way how the bank obtains means to repay it debts play no role,
important is that the bank would start the next period with negative capital
in case of losses (as in Gersbach and Wenzelburger, 2002, and Vinogradov,
2003)
As it has been already mentioned, the resolution methods are seen by de-
positors from another perspective as by banks. Whether depositors receive
their funds back, depends on the resolution method chosen. In case of no liq-
uidation (the bank obtains continuation loan, new deposits or even a subsidy
from the regulator) deposit repayments are sure. If the failing institution
is assumed, through merger, acquisition or nationalisation, its liabilities are
not necessarily assumed in full, so that depositors can generally account for
3This is consistent with the actual practice. Santomero and Ho¤man (1998) note, that
regulators often delay resolution actions in the hope of a turnaround.
4Reserve considerations omitted.
3partial repayments. And …nally, if the failed …nancial institution is liqui-
dated, its uninsured creditors receive only the rest value of bank’s assets.
This asymmetry in views of bankers and depositors on possible outcomes,
plays a crucial role in the model. To sharpen the e¤ect, we will focus on
two possible outcomes: bailout (which leads to continuation) or liquidation
performed by the regulating authority. Hence in the world without bailouts
depositors have to expect liquidation of an insolvent bank, and consequently
deposit repayments in amount of rest value of the bank.
The Paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 introduces the model. Sections
2 and 3 study consequently monopolistic and competitive equilibria in both
worlds (with and without limited liability). Section 4 presents a rationale
for regulation, and Section 5 studies the e¤ects of bailouts in the world with
unlimited liability. Concluding remarks close the paper.
1 The Model
Consider an economy witha continuumofagents [indexedby] i 2 [0;1], called
households, a banking sector (which can be monopolistic or competitive)
and two types of …nancial assets (one risky an one risk-free). In this world,
households do not have access to the market of risky assets, but the banks
do.
The model describes two periods: in the …rst the decision-making and
investing is performed, and in the second period one of the two (”H” for
”high and ”L for ”low”) states of nature are realised, and payments made.
Risky asset brings return of rH in the second period, if the state of nature
”H” is realised, with probability p, and of rL; if the state of nature ”L” is
realised, with probability (1 ¡ p).
We will assume that
rH > rF > rL (A.1)
The case of equality is trivial and does not allow for any uncertainty. The
case rH > rL ¸ rF (and consequently rF ¸ rH > rL) is not of particular
interest since it eliminates uncertainty in agents’ decisions: risky asset is
preferred to the safe one since it provides higher rate of return in any state
of nature (or, respectively, safe asset is always preferred to the risky one).
Moreover we assume that the expected return on risky asset is higher
than return on the risk-free asset:
pr
H + (1¡ p)r
L > r
F (A.2)
Note that this assumption implies that in a world of risk-neutral agents,
4risky asset is always preferred to the risk-free one; and if households had
access to the market of risky assets, they would always invest in this market.
1.1 Banks
We consider intermediated economy, where the existence of banks is justi…ed
by the inability of households to access the market for risky assets. In such
a world, …nancial intermediation should provide a link between creditors
(households) and borrowers (…rms, who are not directly modelled here, but
rather presented as some risky project implemented at the market of risky
assets).
The banks collect deposits in amount Dd and invest them in portfolio of


































Figure 1: Choice of Banks






































If the bank is insolvent, each depositor receives
VL
Dd so that the ”insolven-
cy”return on deposits in this case will be
e r =
(
xrH + (1¡ x)rF if rH is realised
xrL +(1 ¡ x)rF if rL is realised
)
(1)
5Lemma 1 Given the parameters rH, rF, rL and p, the probability of deposit










0 if rD > xrH + (1¡ x)rF
p if xrH + (1¡ x)rF ¸ rD > xrL + (1¡ x)rF





Proof. Consider three following possibilities:
















with probability 1, and the bank is solvent with probability q = 0












































and the bank is insolvent, so that the repayments probability is in this
case q = p
















with probability q = 1.
Note on notation Since distinguishing between three cases above is also
conducted further in the analysis, we will denote them as follows:
Case C1 if rD > xrH + (1 ¡ x)rF
Case C2 if xrH +(1¡ x)rF ¸ rD > xrL+ (1 ¡x)rF
Case C3 if rD · xrL + (1¡ x)rF
It is easy to see that C1 stays for the case, when the banks are never
solvent, nomatter whichstate of nature is realisedinthe second period.
Similarly, C3 denotes the case, when the banks are always solvent, no
matter which state of nature is realised in the second period. And
the intermediate case C2 describes such constellations of interest rates,
under which the banks are solvent if the state of nature ”H” is realised,
and insolvent if ”L” is realised in the second period.
61.2 Households
All households in the model are equal in their preferences and abilities, so
that there is no heterogeneity. The households have to decide whether they
invest their endowment Q5 into the safe asset or into deposit, or combine































Figure 2: Choice of Households
Households know, that they get their deposits back in full in period 2
with probability q (which at this stage means, that the bank is solvent in
the second period), and the interest paid on deposits will be exactly the
announced deposit interest rate rD. With probability (1 ¡ q) depositors
cannot get their deposits back in full, instead the rest value (Freixas, 2000,
calls this liquidation value) of the bank VL is equally distributed among all
depositors and the interest rate paid on deposits in this case we denote with
e r (we de…ne it further)
























aQdi = aQ (4)
5Assumption of the …xed amount to be invested by households can be relaxed. The
key feature of the model arises due to the corner solution in the problem of the choice of
optimal amount of deposits. If we assume the agents decide upon their savings (making
Q endogenous), which can be either invested in risk-free asset or deposited, the corner
solution with zero deposits still persists, since the choice of households between two types
of assets is unchanged. Assuming Q = const however simpli…es the presentation.
71.3 Supply of deposits
Total supply of deposits, as de…ned by (4), is determined by the choice of a
by households. We can reformulate the expected pro…t of depositors (3):
G







qrD + (1¡ q) e r
´
+ (1¡ a)rF
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+ (1¡ a)rF if C1
a
h
prD + (1¡ p)
³
xrL +(1 ¡ x)rF
´i











> > > =
> > > ;
(5)










The solution of this problem a = argmaxRe
D can be found as follows:
1. if rD > xrH + (1¡ x)rF then
a =
8
> > > <
> > > :
1 if x
³
prH + (1¡ p)rL
´
+ (1¡ x)rF > rF
a 2 [0;1] if x
³
prH + (1¡ p)rL
´
+ (1¡ x)rF = rF
0 if x
³
prH + (1¡ p)rL
´
+ (1¡ x)rF < rF
9
> > > =
> > > ;
(7)
2. if xrH + (1¡ x)rF ¸ rD ¸ xrL + (1¡ x)rF then
a =
8
> > > <
> > > :
















> > > =
> > > ;
(8)
3. if rD < xrL+ (1 ¡x)rF then
a = 0 since r
D < r
F (9)
8To avoid indeterminacy in the choice of depositors, and in order to make
presentation easier we will assume further that depositors prefer deposits to
risk-free asset as soon as the expected return on deposits is equal or greater





The discussion above leads to the following proposition:





















First, recall that aggregate deposit supply is given by (4):
D
s = aQ
To derive the equation (10), substitute here for the optimal choice of a
by households (7 - 9). We use here the equivalence of the two problems:
a = argmaxRe
D () a = argmaxGe
Note that due to (1) condition x
³
prH + (1¡ p)rL
´
+(1 ¡ x)rF · rF in
(7) is never met. Hence
a = argmaxGe = 1 if rd > xrH + (1¡ x)rF
Moreover, condition prD + (1¡ p)
³
xrL + (1¡ x)rF
´
> rF is automati-
cally satis…ed if rd > xrH + (1¡ x)rF:
prD + (1¡ p)
³
























xrL + (1¡ x)rF
´
· rF is automaticallysatis…ed
if rd < xrL +(1 ¡ x)rF:
pr
D +(1 ¡ p)
³
xr


















L + (1¡ x)r
F · r
F
6This assumption only simpli…es presentation without change in results.
9Finally, condition prD+(1¡ p)
³
xrL + (1¡ x)rF
´











As soon as supply of deposits is determined, we may proceed to the
study of monopolistic and competitive demands for deposits from the side of
banking sector, and to consequent equilibria.
2 Monopolistic equilibrium

















2. a¤ = argmaxGe





4. Ds = Dd
Consider now the monopolist bank, which maximises its expected pro…t
2.1 Limited Liability
























The bank can choose the amount of deposits through setting deposit























0 · x · 1 (13)



















Proposition 2 Optimal choice of the monopolist bank under limited liability
is x = 1 and rD







This result is easily found with Kuhn-Tucker maximisation rule.
Condition rD






means that the demand for deposits
is arbitrary (in…nitely high interest rate elasticity of demand)
Proposition 3 If limited liability principle holds, monopolistic equilibrium
in the model is given by:
8
> > > > <












> > > > =
> > > > ;
(14)
Proof. First, we need to check whether these parameters satisfy the de…n-





= argmax¦e is met by
construction (monopolistic bank maximises its expected pro…t). Expected














Q > 0 (15)
And the market for deposits clears by construction (see derivation of the
optimal choice of the bank).
Assume now there exists another combination of variables, which still
meets the de…nition of equilibrium. Then by construction this combination
of parameters will coincide with the one given in the text of this proposition.
Hence the equilibrium is unique.
112.2 Unlimited Liability
Consider now monopoly bank, which does not rely on the limited liability
principle. The bank also maximises its expected pro…t, but its optimisation





















Again deposit supply function (10) allows to reformulate the maximisa-



























0 · x · 1































if p2 < rF¡rL
rH¡rL
Proof.
This result again is easy to be found with the help of Kuhn-Tucker opti-
misation rule.
Proposition 5 If limited liability principle does not hold, monopolistic equi-
12librium in the model is given by:
8
> > > > <












> > > > =
> > > > ;
if p2 > rF¡rL
rH¡rL
8
> > > > <











> > > > =
> > > > ;
if p2 = rF¡rL
rH¡rL
8
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1. First, we need to check whether these parameters satisfy the de…nition





= argmax¦e is met by
construction (monopolistic bank maximises its expected pro…t). Ex-
















And the market for deposits clears by construction (see derivation of
the optimal choice of the bank).
Assume now there exists another combination of variables, which still
meets the de…nition of equilibrium. Then by construction this combi-
nation of parameters will coincide with the one given in the text of this
proposition. Hence the equilibrium is unique.
2. If p2 = rF¡rL
rH¡rL; the choice of the bank is arbitrary within the inter-
val x¤ 2 [0;1]. Moreover since p2 =
rF¡rL




prH + (1¡ p)rL
´
+ (1¡ x)rF implies xrH + (1¡ x)rF > rD >







3. If p2 <
rF¡rL
rH¡rL; the choice of the bank is trivial x¤ = 0 and rD
m = rF,




Q > 0. Again if any other
equilibrium of this type would exist, by construction it would coincide
with the tuple (18).
13Propositions 3 and 5 highlight the di¤erence between the two equilibria.
In the case with limited liability assumption (A.2) is su¢cient to guaran-
tee that the intermediation (bank) links creditors and borrowers. Unlimited
liability however requires from the bank to be more demanding in its es-
timations of expected return, which implies additional requirement needed
to ensure positive expected pro…t. Hence monopolistic bank can fail under
unlimited liability to link creditors and borrowers. We return to this failure
after analysis of competitive banking sector.
3 Competitive equilibrium











1. a¤ = argmaxGe
2. x¤ = argmax¦e















Now competitive banks cannot in‡uence deposit interest rate. We distin-
guish again between limited liability and unlimited liability cases:
3.1 Limited Liability
Optimisation problem of the banks under limited liability is:
¦e = pmax
h³




























xrH + (1¡ x)rF ¡ rD
´
Dd if C2 h
x
³
prH + (1 ¡p)rL
´
















s.t. 0 < x < 1 (20)
D
d ¸ 0 (21)
is given by the following proposition:
Proposition 6 Competitive demand for deposits under limited liability is




A 2 [0;1) if rD ¸ rH




To prove the proposition we just need to consider again cases C1, C2 and
C3 and to solve three correspondent maximisation problems.
Condition a¤ = argmaxGe in the de…nition of equilibrium above is ful-
…lled throughoptimisationproblemofhouseholds. Conditionx¤ = argmax¦e












Comparing (10) and (22) we obtain
1. if rD < rH equilibrium is impossible since deposit demand is in…nitely
high and deposit supply bounded from above: Ds · Q. Banks continue
to compete for deposits, increasing rD.







supply is Ds = Q while deposit demand is arbitrary, which means that
the banks collect exactly the amount of deposits suppliedby depositors,
and equilibrium amount of deposits is D¤ = Q. Along with that,















But (1 ¡ p)x
¡
rF ¡ rL¢
· (1 ¡ p)
¡
rF ¡ rL¢







, which is a contradiction to Assumption (A.2) rF < prH + (1¡ p) rL.
15Proposition 7 In case of limited liability competitive equilibrium is multiple
and given by: 8
> > > <







> > > =
> > > ;
(23)
Proof.
To complete the proof we just need to determine q, which is straightfor-
ward (see Lemma1).
Note that although probability of deposit repayments is zero, supply of
deposits is still positive, since depositors expect to obtain the rest value
(liquidation value) of the bank, which is higher than return on safe asset
(due to assumption A.2). This result is known also from Matutes and Vives
(2000), who write: ”when competition is intense banks tend to set deposit
rates too high... With perfect competition rates are excessive”. Matutes and
Vives (2000) attribute this e¤ect to the fact that the bank do not internalise
the cost of failure. Indeed, we will see below that relaxing the assumption of
limited liability eliminates this problem.8
3.2 Unlimited Liability





prH + (1¡ p)rL
´









. Note that since by assumption prH + (1¡ p)rL > rF solution
of this maximisation problem is x¤ = 1 and the following proposition is
straightforward:






0 if rD > prH + (1¡ p)rL
A 2 [0;1) if rD = prH + (1¡ p)rL





8Introduction of equity capital in the decision-making by bank would also eliminate
the possibility for deposit rates to be higher than rH, but they will still be higher than
the expected rate of return on risky asset.
16Similarly to the case with limited liability, we need now just to meet the










. Note that due to x¤ = 1





















To …nd equilibrium we have to distinguish between following cases:






then 8Q < 1 equality Dd =
Ds is ful…lled under competitive interest rate rD
c = prH + (1 ¡ p)rL,
and the equilibrium amount of deposits in banks is D¤ = Q. Setting
interest rate below or above this level eliminates equilibrium due to
Dd = 0 or Dd = A ! 1.






then (1) rD < prH+(1¡ p)rL







as well to disequilibrium Dd 6= Ds. Hence equilibrium can arise only
with prH + (1 ¡ p)rL · rD







Ds = Q = Dd = D¤.
This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 9 In case of unlimited liability competitive equilibrium is given
by:
8
> > > <





c = prH +(1 ¡ p)rL
9
> > > =
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To complete the proof note that
pr















c = prH +(1 ¡ p)rL, it provides rL · rD
c · rH, which
under x¤ = 1 guarantees q¤ = p. This proves …rst part of the proposition.
























follows that rL · rD
c < rH and again under x¤ = 1 Lemma 1 guarantees
q¤ = p:
4 Rationale for regulation
The two economies describedhere di¤eronly inthevalidity of limitedliability
principle. Inthe world with limitedliability, banking system provides a miss-
ing link between creditors and borrowers, if banking sector has monopolistic
structure. In case of competitive banking system, creditors (households) still
deposit with the banks, but whether the banks invest in risky projects, and
how much, is indeterminate: x¤ 2 [0;1]. Moreover competitive equilibrium in
case of limited liability produces arbitrarily high deposit interest rate, which
plays no role, since depositors know, that the probability of deposit repay-
ments is zero, and count only for the expected liquidation value of the banks,
which is still higher than the return from safe asset.
Economy with unlimited liability exhibits two di¤erent properties de-
pending on the ratio between p2 and
rF ¡rL
rH¡rL. If p2 >
rF¡rL
rH¡rL; equilibrium with
positive amount of deposits in banks exists and is unique under both mo-
nopolistic and competitive banking systems. If p2 = rF¡rL
rH¡rL; unique positive
equilibrium still exists under competitive banking system, but is multiple un-
der monopolistic banking sector. Already in this case it is possible that the
monopolist bank invests only in risk-free asset (x = 0) and if the risky asset
represents …nancial obligations of productive …rms, this means interruption
of the channelling of funds from savers (households) to borrowers (…rms).
Finally, if p2 < rF¡rL
rH¡rL, monopolistic structure of banking sector leaves no
other possibility than such equilibrium with broken funds channelling, and
competitive banking sector leads to degenerate equilibrium, in which there
are no deposits in banking system, which is called disintermediation.
To make clear whether equilibria without investment in risky asset are in-
e¢cient, compare intermediated case considered above with the case, where
depositors would have direct access to …nancial market with risky asset. De-
18positors choose then between two assets: risky and risk-free, and their deci-




1 if prH +(1 ¡ p)rL ¸ rF
0 if prH +(1 ¡ p)rL < rF
)
And since by assumption (A.2) prH + (1 ¡ p)rL > rF, optimal choice
of households in the case of direct investment would always be in favour of
risky asset. In other words the amount Idir invested in risky asset without
intermediation is
Idir = Q
If, however, the economy is intermediated, and the principle of limited
liability does not hold9, investments Iint in risky asset are (generally written





Q if p2 > rF¡rL
rH¡rL
Iint 2 [0;Q] if p2 = rF¡rL
rH¡rL





Note that there exists a nonempty set of possible values of p
0 <
rF ¡ rL
rH ¡ rL < p <
s
rF ¡ rL
rH ¡ rL < 1
which10 still meets the assumption (A.2) and hence would lead to positive
investment in risky asset in case without intermediation, but leads to zero
risky investments in intermediated case. We call such equilibria ine¢cient.
The intuition behind this ine¢ciency is that the depositors require from
banks higher interest rate than if they would require from issuers of risky
assets directly. To avoid ine¢cient equilibria a regulatory intervention is
needed.
The purpose of the regulator could be therefore to provide conditions for
positive equilibria, i.e. to guarantee p2 > rF¡rL
rH¡rL. Since rL and rH are macro-
economic parameters, describing [in particular] productive opportunities of
…rms, they cannot be regulated endogenously.
9The outcomes in the economy with limited liability are described above: Iint = Q in
case of monopoly or Iint 2 [0;Q] in case of competitive banking sector independently on
macroeconomic parameters p; rH ; rL; and rF.
10Note that the expression under the square root is always positive due to assumption
rH > rF > rL.
19The regulation of risk-free rate of return rF could also help against rup-
ture of funds channelling: setting it as close as possible to rL ensures that
p2 > rF¡rL
rH¡rL and hence a unique nondegenerate equilibrium will necessar-
ily exist under both monopolistic and competitive structures of the banking
sector. Modelling regulation of rF requires modelling a …nancial market of
this asset. Along with that this measure would be a short-term market in-
tervention in order to increase or to decrease the rate of return. At the
same time the probability of success p describes rather a long-term macro-
economic trend, and tuning …nancial system to long-term tendencies through
short-term interventions seems not to be an appropriate solution.
The only parameter ”responsible” for existence of positive equilibrium is
p2, which also seems to be an exogenously given macroeconomic parameter.
But recall that p2 is obtained through two types of probabilities described
in the model, i.e. the exogenous probability p of getting rH on risky asset,
and endogenous probability of deposit repayments q. Up to now, the equilib-
rium value of repayments probability in case of unlimited liability was q = p.
Instead we suggest to decompose p2, i.e. to introduce asymmetry between
probability q of deposit repayments, and the probability p of investment suc-
cess. More precisely we suggest to introduce the possibility of bailouts in
banking system, which would guarantee that the depositors of bailed-out
banks get their deposits in full and with interest accrued on them, indepen-
dently of the fact whether their bank is solvent or not in the second period.
Intuitively, this measure should lower the critical deposit rate, which is a
threshold between zero and nonzero deposit supply, and hence this should
increase the space for nondegenerate equilibria to appear.
5 Regulated economy
Regulator is responsible for bailouts or liquidation of banks. Bailout pre-
sumes paying the debts of the bank out to depositors in order to save the
bank. Liquidation means selling bank assets in case of its insolvency and
transferring the proceeds to the depositors indemnifying for banks’ debts.
In general regulator does not promise to save the banks unambiguously, but
rather announces some probability of bailouts z.
If the banks in period 2 are not able to repay all their debts, the regulator
can intervene and bail the banks out. If the bailout is performed (which
probability is z), depositors receive their deposits in full withinterest accrued
on them. If, however, the bailout is not performed, the banks are liquidated
andtherepayments todepositors are determined by thevalue ofbanks’ assets
inperiod 2. Depositors are informed about the values of p, z and the share of
20risky asset in banks’ portfolios x, so that they can form expectations about
future repayments on deposits, given the announced deposit rate rD.
Two bailout scenarios are possible. In case of unconditional bailouts,
the regulator saves failing …nancial institutions in period 2 with probability
z, whatever the state of the nature in period 2 is. In case of conditional
bailouts, the regulator saves failing …nancial institutions with probability z
only if ”L”-state of nature is realised in period 2. Since in equilibrium banks
can fail only if the state of nature ”L” is realised, both scenarios lead to the
same equilibrium outcome (detailed analysis can be found in Vinogradov,
2004). Therefore all considerations hereinafter are based at the example of
unconditional bailouts.
Lemma 2 Given the parameters rH, rF, rL and p, and the probability of

















The proof is similar to Lemma 1.
Consider now decisions made by the agents in case LOLR announces in
period 1 unconditional bailouts policy: no matter what is the state of the
nature in period 2, banks are bailed out with probability z.
5.1 Supply of deposits






















The proof repeats the proof of Proposition 1.
5.2 Expected pro…t of the banks
If unconditional bailouts are performed with the probability z, the expected
































xrH + (1¡ x)rF ¡ rD
xrL +(1 ¡ x)rF ¡rD
max
³




xrL + (1¡ x)rF ¡ rD;0
´
Figure 3: Pro…t/Deposits ratio of banks in case of unconditional bailouts
Indeed, if the bank is bailed out, probability of which is z, the bank ob-
tains additional funds(ina form ofcontinuation loan from LOLRornewly ac-
cumulated deposits) and continues its operations, so that its expected pro…t
is the same as above. If however the bank is not bailed out, with probability
(1 ¡ z), the principle of limited liability is valid, since the bank is liquidated
and its debts are covered in amount not exceeding the value of bank’s assets.




























xrL + (1¡ x)rF ¡ rD;0
´
Dd
5.3 Monopoly: demand for deposits and monopolistic
equilibrium











11Remember that we concentrate on only one e¤ect of bailout, namely that the bank is
let to coninue its operations.
22Toprove theproposition it su¢ces to consider again3 cases C1, C2 and C3
and …nd a solution of pro…t maximisation problem in each case. Obviously
case C1 leads to negative pro…t of the bank and consequent choice of x¤ = 0
and rD
m = rF to eliminate losses. Both cases C2 and C3 lead to choice of
x¤ = 1, but C3 leads to zero pro…t due to zero deposit supply. Being a
price-maker, monopolist bank chooses interest rate to maximise pro…t, and
this choice is (29). It is easy to check that under this choice expected pro…t
of the bank is always positive, and no additional condition is needed.
Proposition 12 Monopolistic equilibrium under unconditional bailouts is
given by 8
> > > > <
> > > > :
x¤ = 1
a¤ = 1
q¤ = p +(1 ¡ p)z
rD







> > > > =
> > > > ;
(30)
Proof. Condition Dd = Ds is met through pro…t maximisation problem of
the bank. It is easy to check, that other conditions from the de…nition of
equilibrium are met as well.
With z = 0 this result turns into monopolistic equilibrium under lim-
ited liability (14). Intuition behind this fact is that announcement of zero
probability of bailouts means that there is no other alternative for failing
banks as liquidation. This is exactly what limited liability principle is: if
the bank fails, its creditors receive only its rest value. Sinn (2003) calls this
BLOOS-rule: ”you can’t get blood out of a stone”.
With z = 1 this result would represent another symmetric case: when
both banks and depositors believe that the banks will continue in the second
period, and will be able (for whatever reason) to repay on deposits). Monop-
olist bank then sets interest rate at rD
m = rF, and the probability of deposit
repayments is q¤ = 1. We did not analyse this case at the beginning of the
paper, since its’ analysis just resembles the case of limited liability.
The case, onwhich we focused, was rather asymmetry in beliefs of deposi-
tors andbanks, where depositors believe that failing banks will be closed, but
the banks believe to continue, and so act within unlimited liability principle.
This possibility for asymmetry is now excluded, since the regulator (LOLR
or Central Bank) announces its policy with respect to bailing institutions.
We can thus expect that this announcement e¤ect would produce certainty
about competitive equilibrium, which was previously not the case.
235.4 Competitive banking sector: demand for deposits
and competitive equilibrium
Similarly to the competitive case without bailouts, we can prove following:
Proposition 13 Competitive demand for deposits under bailouts is given by
Dd =
8
> > > <
> > > :
0 if rD > 1
z+(1¡z)p
³
prH + z (1¡ p)rL
´
D 2 [0;1) if rD = 1
z+(1¡z)p
³
prH + z (1¡ p)rL
´
D ! 1 if rD < 1
z+(1¡z)p
³
prH + z (1¡ p)rL
´
9
> > > =
> > > ;
(31)
Proof.
Eachcompetitive bank maximises its pro…t but cannot in‡uence rD. Case
C1 is trivial, since leads to Dd = 0. Case C3 is also trivial and leads to Dd =
D ! 1. Case C2 produces optimal x¤ = 1, and consequent maximisation of
pro…t with respect to Dd leads to distinguishing between cases with di¤erent
signs of …rst derivative of pro…t (and Lagrangian), as in Proposition 6, and
leads to the solution (31).
To determine competitive equilibrium we again just need to satisfy the
condition Dd = Ds.
Proposition 14 Competitive equilibriumunderunconditional bailouts isgiven
by the following:
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
x¤ = 1
a¤ = 1






prH +z (1 ¡p)rL
´
9
> > > > =
> > > > ;
(32)
Proof.





prH +z (1¡ p)rL
´
.
Higher interest rate generates excessive supply (under zero deposit demand
according to equation 31). Lower interest rate generates excessive (in…nitely
high) deposit demand. We need only to check, that the deposit supply with
rD
c from (32) is positive. This is guaranteed by the assumption A.2.
Note again that under z ! 0, this equilibrium is very similar to compet-
itive equilibrium under limited liability. However now we have no failure of
24…nancial intermediation, and all funds collected from households are invested
in risky asset, as it would be if the households had direct access to the risky
asset market. Moreover, with z ! 0 competitive equilibrium is unique and
characterised by interest rate rD
c = rH. If z ! 1, competitive banking sector
o¤ers deposit interest rate exactly at the level of expected rate of return of
the risky asset, which is higher than monopolistic equilibrium at the risk-free
rate.
6 Conclusions
We started this paper with comparison of …nancial intermediation systems
in two di¤erent worlds: one with and one without limited liability. The liter-
ature on …nancial intermediation stresses the role of …nancial intermediaries
in channelling funds from creditors to borrowers if they can not have a direct
deal at the …nancial market. This was also the starting point in this paper.
We show however, that intermediation can fail to do this.
In the world with limited liability, monopoly bank successfully links cred-
itors and borrowers and invests all the funds collected from households in
risky asset, as would be in case of direct investment. This result changes
dramatically as soon as the banking sector is competitive. Competition un-
der limitedliability forces banks to choose excessively high(above the highest
possible at the risky asset market) deposit interest rate (which can not even
be bounded from above), and knowing that this strategy leads to zero pro…t,
banks loose incentives to invest all deposit collected in risky asset. Hence,
they freely choose the share of risky asset in their portfolio 0 · x · 1, and
in general case aggregate investment in risky asset is below its level attained
if households have direct access to …nancial markets.
In the world with unlimited liability (in which, however, depositors do
not believe) both monopolistic and competitive equilibria can ensure e¢-
cient intermediation (in sense that all funds are channelled from creditors to
borrowers). Asymmetry in views of depositors and banks (the …rst believe
that insolvent banks are liquidated, and the latter believe that they will be
allowed to operate further) generates, however, another possibility for …nan-
cial intermediation to fail in channelling funds from depositors to the risky
asset market. This failure arises if the probability of success in risky invest-
ment is not su¢ciently high, but can be corrected through bailout policy of
the regulator.
Bailout policy of the regulator has two e¤ects. First it is an announce-
ment e¤ect, which eliminates asymmetry in the beliefs of banks and house-
holds. Secondly, it is insurance e¤ect, which lowers both monopolistic and
25competitive equilibrium interest rates. An announcement e¤ect does not re-
quire from the regulator to follow the policy of unambiguous or ambiguous
bailouts, instead the probability of bailouts can be chosen at the level of
z = 0, but the market should still expect that the continuation is possible. A
similar e¤ect of the bailout policy can also be found in Hakenes and Schnabel
(2004) who write that the result is ”independent on whether the government
does in fact bail out banks, or whether markets only expect the government
to do so. Since the negative impact arises from the expectations of market
participants, the government should try to build up a reputation of being
committed to a zero-bail-out policy”. The question of optimal policy design
was not in the focus of this current paper, but the principle of regulator’s
credibility plays an important role in announcement e¤ect.
Turning to the case of unlimited liability is another way to weaken the
principle of limited liability, which causes the problem in competitive case.
Matutes and Vives (2000), for example, suggest that a ”fair and risk-based
deposit insurance makes banks fully liable”, which is a kind of endogeni-
sation of the banks’ responsibility under limited liability. Allen and Gale
(2000) relax limited liability by assuming that the banks can always choose
zero amount of deposits to be collected, which turns their pro…t to be non-
negative. However this destructs the link between creditors and borrowers.
Competition in …nancial intermediation generates complex and non-trivial
problems, which are reviewed by Allen and Gale (2004), and this current
paper contributes to the search for particular solutions.
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8 Appendix
Proposition 2 Optimal choice of the monopolist bank under limited liabil-
ity is x = 1 and rD




























and the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are
@L
@x






+ ¹1 ¡ ¹2 = 0 (33)
@L
@rD = ¡1 +¹0 = 0 (34)








Given ¹0 = 1, second KT-condition (34) transforms into
prH + (1¡ p)rL ¡ rF + p¹1 ¡ p¹2 = 0
Under assumption (1) this implies ¹2 > 0, and consequently x = 1.































if p2 < rF¡rL
rH¡rL



















+ ¹1x+ ¹2(1 ¡ x)














+ ¹1¡ ¹2 = 0 (35)
@L
@rD = ¡1+ ¹0 = 0 (36)






















+ p¹1 ¡ p¹2 = 0
Hence ¹2 > 0, and consequently x = 1 and rD






















On the contrary, ¹1 > 0, and consequently x = 0 and rD




Finally, if p2 = rF¡rL
rH¡rL, the bank is indi¤erent between investing in safe
or risky asset, so that x is arbitrary x 2 [0;1]; and the pro…t of the bank is
zero. In this case we just need to note that
rD






















Proposition 6 Competitive demand for deposits under limited liability is
given by a correspondence
Dd =
(
A 2 [0;1) if rD ¸ rH




Consider …rst condition C1. If rD > rH ¸ xrH +(1¡ x)rF than decision
of the banks is arbitrary. Assume now that rH ¸ rD > xrH + (1 ¡x)rF.
Pro…t-maximising banks set x¤ = 1, and condition C1 turns to rD = rH.
Optimal choice ofthe amount ofdeposits in banks’ portfolio is againarbitrary
and denoted with A 2 [0;1).
































L ¡ (1¡ x)r
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xrH + (1¡ x)rF ¡ rD
´
+ ¹3 = 0 (39)
Assumption rH > rF > rL implies ¹2 > 0 and consequently x = 1.
Substituting this into the second KT-condition obtain ¹3 < 0, which contra-
dicts the properties of Lagrange multipliers, and hence demand for deposits
is in…nitely large. Condition C2 turns in this case into rH > rD ¸ rL
Finally in case C3 banks maximise their pro…t given by h
x
³
prH + (1¡ p)rL
´
+(1¡ x)rF ¡ rD
i
Dd.





prH + (1¡ p)rL
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xrL +(1 ¡ x)rF ¡ rD
´




































> rF condition(41) implies ¹3 < 0
and demand for deposits is again in…nitely large Dd ! 1. Therefore in
condition (40) 8rL;rF > 0 and 8¹0 ¸ 0 9Dd : ¹2 > 0 and consequently
x = 1. Condition C3 turns into rD < rL
30